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Committee	membership	makes	Representatives
better	lawmakers,	benefitting	Congress	as	a	whole
The	US	House	of	Representatives	has	more	than	20	committees	which	divide	up	lawmaking	and
encourage	lawmakers	to	specialize.	Committee	members	are	also	more	likely	to	promote	legislation
in	their	committee’s	areas.	Kristina	Miler	finds	that	specialization	promotes	legislating;	committees
are	successful	in	compelling	even	otherwise	uninterested	legislators	to	be	more	active.	In	light	of
these	findings,	she	argues	that	delegating	power	to	committees	is	beneficial	to	Congress	and	that
efforts	to	elevate	the	importance	of	committees	should	be	welcomed.
Committees	are	integral	to	how	the	US	Congress	works,	as	a	way	to	divide	the	immense	task	of	lawmaking	and
foster	specialization	by	policy	area.	For	instance,	in	today’s	House	of	Representative,	there	are	more	than	twenty
committees	devoted	to	areas	such	as	Education	and	the	Workforce,	Small	Business,	and	Homeland	Security.
Political	scientists	have	shown	that	committee	members	are	far	more	active	in	legislating	on	issues	that	relate	to
their	committees	as	compared	to	non-committee	members.	Less	clear	is	why	this	is	the	case.		Is	it	because
committee	members	are	inherently	more	interested	in	those	issues,	or	does	their	position	on	the	committee
provide	unique	information	and	advantages?
I	answer	this	long-standing	question	by	looking	at	novel	data	on	the	committee	requests	and	actual	committee
assignments	of	incoming	House	members.	Overall,	I	find	that	position	trumps	interests.	The	behavior	of
committee	members	who	requested	their	seats	is	largely	indistinguishable	from	the	behavior	of	committee
members	who	did	not,	albeit	with	two	interesting	caveats.	First,	it	takes	some	time	for	the	institutional	position	of
being	on	a	committee	to	affect	legislators’	behavior.	Second,	those	who	expressed	interest	in	the	issue	by
requesting	the	committee	end	up	being	more	successful	in	passing	legislation.
Upon	election	to	the	House,	legislators	request	the	committees	on	which	they	would	like	to	serve.	Party	leaders
then	make	the	committee	assignments	based	on	these	requests	as	well	as	factors	like	the	available	seats,	norms
of	regional	balance,	and	legislators’	electoral	security.	A	common	assumption	is	that	all	committee	members
wanted	to	be	on	the	committee(s)	on	which	they	serve.	But	this	is	not	true.	Looking	at	incoming	legislators	who
joined	the	US	House	of	Representatives,	I	first	show	that	fully	one-third	of	freshmen	are	assigned	to	committees
that	they	did	not	request.
This	variation	creates	an	opportunity	to	examine	competing	arguments	for	why	committee	members	are	more
active	on	policy	than	other	House	members.	One	argument	is	that	committee	members	have	a	particular	interest
in	a	policy	area	that	leads	them	to	be	on	the	relevant	committee	–	and	then	also	to	sponsor	more	legislation	in
those	areas.	From	this	perspective,	committees	sort	legislators	according	to	pre-existing	interests,	which	raises
concerns	that	committees	are	composed	of	outliers	and	are	not	representative	of	the	full	House.	A	second
argument	is	that	the	institutional	design	of	the	committee	system	promotes	heightened	individual	activity	by
providing	committees	with	additional	staff	and	resources,	as	well	as	with	procedural	prerogatives	in	the
policymaking	process,	such	as	conducting	hearings.	According	to	this	perspective,	then,	committee	members	are
uniquely	active	because	their	position	reduces	the	cost	of	participating.
To	arbitrate	between	these	two	perspectives,	I	follow	the	careers	of	four	cohorts	of	members	of	the	US	House	of
Representatives	over	their	first	four	terms	in	office	(1987-2000).	I	compare	their	committee	requests,	which	are
drawn	from	scholars’	archival	research	with	their	official	committee	assignments	to	identify	which	legislators
requested	their	committee	seat	and	which	did	not.	I	then	examine	whether	requesting	one’s	seat	increases	the
number	of	relevant	bills	a	committee	member	sponsors,	while	holding	aside	any	possible	effects	of	being	in	the
majority	party	or	previous	professional	experience	in	the	policy	area.
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“House	Committee	on	Homeland	Security	Hearing”	by	U.S.	Department	of	Homeland	Security	(DHS)	is	US	Government	work
My	analyses	reveal	no	significant	difference	in	the	actions	of	committee	members	who	asked	to	serve	on	a
committee	and	those	who	did	not;	committees	are	successful	in	compelling	even	otherwise	uninterested
legislators	to	be	active.	Committee	members,	whether	they	wanted	to	be	on	the	committee	or	not,	sponsor	much
more	legislation	in	the	issue	area	than	non-committee	members.	In	fact,	they	are	twice	as	active	as	legislators
who	expressed	interest	in	the	policy	area	but	are	not	on	the	committee.
The	advantages	that	come	with	serving	on	a	committee,	however,	do	not	accrue	to	members	overnight.	During
their	first	term	in	the	House,	legislators’	interest	in	a	policy	area	actually	plays	a	larger	role.	Committee	members
who	expressed	their	interest	in	a	policy	area,	such	as	agriculture	or	transportation,	initially	sponsor	more	bills	on
those	issues	than	committee	members	who	did	not	request	their	seat.	But	after	the	first	term,	the	reluctant
committee	members	catch	up	to	them	–	as	discussed	above	–	and	committee	members	cannot	be	distinguished
from	one	another.
Legislators’	interests	also	matter	in	one	other	way	–	when	it	comes	to	ushering	legislation	through	the
congressional	process.	Bills	by	committee	members	who	requested	their	seat	are	more	likely	to	pass	the	House
than	bills	introduced	by	their	colleagues	who	did	not	ask	to	be	on	the	committee.	This	pattern	suggests	that
legislators	with	greater	personal	interest	in	the	policy	are	more	likely	to	make	the	commitment	necessary	to	guide
a	bill	through	the	long	legislative	process	to	successful	passage	in	the	House.
Committees	are	good	for	Representatives	–	and	for	Congress
What	does	this	all	mean?	Three	major	implications	emerge	from	this	examination	of	committee	requests	and
committee	assignments.	First,	congressional	committees	are	effective	in	fostering	the	division	of	labor	and
development	of	policy	expertise	among	legislators,	regardless	of	legislators’	interest	in	the	issue	area.	Most
striking	is	the	fact	that	legislators	without	constituency-driven	or	personal	interest	in	an	issue	become	active
introducing	legislation	once	they	are	on	a	committee.
Second,	this	result	reduces	concerns	about	committees	as	pockets	of	policy	outliers	wherein	legislators	with
preexisting	interest	in	the	policy	area	select	onto	the	committee	and	render	committees	unrepresentative	of	the
full	House.	In	fact,	my	findings	suggest	that	assigning	legislators	to	committees	that	they	did	not	request	can
reduce	the	potential	bias	of	self-selection	while	maintaining	the	benefits	of	specialization.
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Third,	this	research	suggests	that	delegating	power	to	committees	is	beneficial	to	Congress	and	that	efforts	to
elevate	the	importance	of	committees	should	be	welcomed.	Committees	have	become	less	powerful	in	today’s
highly	partisan	Congress,	which	produces	a	congressional	agenda	more	dominated	by	individual	and	partisan
interests	and	less	informed	by	collective	expertise.	For	many	years,	the	committee	system	in	the	House	was
successful	in	promoting	issue-based	expertise	in	the	legislative	process,	and	the	potential	is	there	for	it	to	serve
this	function	again	in	the	future.
This	article	is	based	on	the	paper,	‘How	Committees	Shape	Legislative	Behavior:	An	Examination	of
Interests	and	Institutions’	in	American	Politics	Research.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.												
Note:		This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	and	not	the	position	of	USAPP–	American	Politics	and	Policy,
nor	of	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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